This paper is concerned with understanding and countering the effects of database attacks on a learning-based linear quadratic adaptive controller. This attack targets neither sensors nor actuators, but just poisons the learning algorithm and parameter estimator that is part of the regulation scheme. We focus on the adaptive optimal control algorithm introduced by Abbasi-Yadkori and Szepesvari and provide regret analysis in the presence of attacks as well as modifications that mitigate their effects. A core step of this algorithm is the self-regularized on-line least squares estimation, which determines a tight confidence set around the true parameters of the system with high probability. In the absence of malicious data injection, this set provides an appropriate estimate of parameters for the aim of control design. However, in the presence of attack, this confidence set is not reliable anymore. Hence, we first tackle the question of how to adjust the confidence set so that it can compensate for the effect of the poisonous data. Then, we quantify the deleterious effect of this type of attack on the optimality of control policy by providing a measure that we call attack regret.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are complex platforms comprised of interacting physical and engineered components integrated through computing and communication capabilities [1] . These networked components can be sensors, actuators, control units, and even learning agents. There is a vast area of applications for CPS including intelligent transportation systems, robotics, and smart grids, to name but a few, which are highly safety critical [2] . These complex platforms are very vulnerable to malicious data injection by adversary agents, who can target any components such as sensors and actuators. As such, designing control and estimation algorithms that can make the system resilient against adversarial signals and attacks has received an everincreasing attention. CPS security is typically addressed in one of two ways. The first avenue is to identify the misbehaving corrupted agents and exclude them. The second approach tackles the problem by designing a resilient control algorithm that can mitigate the attacks [3] . A widely-applied paradigm of the second category attempts to apply game theory and optimal control to design such resilient control protocols [4] , [5] . In the game-theoretic formulation, the attacker tries to exploit the system and poison the sensors or actuators while the system's defender attempts to mitigate the attack and attenuate performance loss. To solve the optimal control problem of this setting when there is no knowledge of systems parameters, Reinforcement Learning (RL) has J. A. Chekan and C. Langbort (emails: jafar2 & langbort@illinois.edu) are with the Coordinated Science Laboratory and the Department of Aerospace Engineering at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC).
shown its effectiveness. RL is applied in [6] , [7] to obtain the optimal control policies through solving Hamilton-Jacobi-Belman (HJB) equation. Although the malicious agents usually targets sensors and actuators, increased complexity of CPS systems is constantly opening new angles of attack for the adversarial agents bringing about dramatically increasing vulnerability. One possible angle of attack can be the learning algorithm of the control unit. As a first approach towards studying this new attack modality, we consider a situation where an unknown linear system controlled by an adaptive control algorithm undergoes a learning algorithm attack.
This situation can be seen as a special case of data poisoning attacks on machine learning algorithms as studied, e.g., in [8] , [9] . An additional complication in the context of adaptive control, however, is that the learning algorithm is in the loop, driving the process to be controlled. The effects of this additional closed loop are not intuitively clear. On the one hand, one may reason that the attack will be more damaging, since false data not only triggers mis-estimation of the system's model, but this mis-estimation may itself result in the computation and injection of an incorrect control input signal, further driving the system's state away from its desired optimal value. On the other hand, one could argue that because the controller constantly adapts itself and receives new measurements, it might be able to correct the effects of an attack if it is limited in space and time.This class of attacks also belongs to the family of so-called false data injection attacks encountered in the field of secure control of CPS (see, e.g., [10] ). What sets them apart within this class, however, is that the injection targets data stored for learning purposes, as opposed to the direct sensor outputs.
A classic approach for adaptive control is to use socalled certainty equivalence principle whereby an estimate of the system's unknown parameters is first obtained and then treating them as true parameters an optimal law is designed. However, as this simple philosophy decouples the estimation problem from control one, it may lead to strictly sub-optimal performance [11] . There are a limited number of research works that attempt to handle this challenge dealing with LQR systems from a model-based RL perspective. Campi and Kumar in [11] by introducing a cost-biased parameter estimator and using the Optimism in the Face of Uncertainty (OFU) principle proposed an algorithm to address the optimal control problem for linear quadratic Gaussian systems with guaranteed asymptotic optimality. However, their analysis lacks a regret bound in finite time and only shows that the average cost converges to that of the optimal control in limit. Abbsi-Yadkori and Szepesvari for the first time applied a learning-based algorithm to address the adaptive optimal control problem with a guaranteed regret bound of O( √ T ) type in T rounds. They proposed a selfregularized online linear estimation algorithm to provide a high probability confidence set around the true parameters of the system [12] and applied this estimation approach coupled with OFU to design control policy for linear quadratic setting [13] . Along similar lines, Ibrahimi et al. [14] later proposed an algorithm that achieves O(p √ T ) regret bound with state space dimension of p. Furthermore, authors in [15] proposed an OFU-based learning algorithm with mild assumptions and O( √ T ) regret. Recently, Cohen et al. [16] while keeping loyalty for the main idea of the algorithm in [13] proposed a computationally efficient algorithm by formulating the LQ control problem in a convex semi-definite programming (SDP) fashion and, as such, resolved the open question of the literature.
In order to quantitatively assess the effect of learning attacks (and settle the question raised above regarding their effects), we place ourselves within the framework of LQ adaptive control and consider a learning-based algorithm for which rigorous regret bounds are available [13] . Building on the approach of [13] , our results take the form of new regret bounds established in the presence of a special kind of attack on the learning algorithm, which we call "database attacks" and of a correction mechanism in the controller. These bounds appear to be tight in simulations, and point towards a way of modifying the confidence set of [13] 's algorithm so as to guarantee a linear regret under attack, even though the original algorithm exhibits much worse performance. The "database attacks" which we consider (and which are motivated and described in more details in Section III) assume that correct instantaneous state measurements are available to the controller but that data stored for learning purposes is tampered with in a remote "database".
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the preliminaries and background. Section III presents the formulation of adaptive optimal control and provides a confidence set and a regret bound of the LQR control system in the presence of the attack. Finally, Section IV summarizes the paper's key contributions by providing simulation results.
II. ASSUMPTIONS, PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
In this section a background review of optimal adaptive control of a LQ system is presented. This section summarizes the key results of [13] and [12] .
Consider the following linear time invariant dynamics and the associated cost functional given by:
where the plant and input matrices A * ∈ R n×n and B * ∈ R n×m are initially unknown and have to be learned. Q ∈ R n×n and R ∈ R m×m represent known and positive definite matrices and ω t+1 is noise signal. The associated average expected cost based on the past observations is written as:
where u 0 , u 1 ,..., u T −1 are chosen based on the policy π starting from x 0 . The regret of this strategy is defined as
where J * is the cost of optimal control strategy computed with knowledge of the matrices A * and B * . R T is a measure of how much the lack of insight into the model affects performance. Following [13] we assume that the system is controllable and observable. By defining,
the system transitions dynamics can be rewritten as:
In the analysis of our setting we will make the following core assumptions, as in [13] .
Assumption (1): Let the sets S 0 and S 1 be defined as follows:
Then, Θ * belongs to the intersection of these sets, i.e. Θ * ∈ S where S ⊂ S 0 ∩ S 1 .
Assumption (2):
There exists a filtration F t such that (2.1) z t and x t are F t -measurable.
) ω t are component-wise sub-Gaussian i.e. there exists L > 0 such that for any γ ∈ R and j = 1,2,...,n
Using the self-normalized process, the least square estimation error up to time t, e(Θ) can be obtained as:
This yields the l 2 -regularized least square estimate:
where Z t and X t are matrices whose rows are z T 0 ,...,z T t−1 and x T 1 ,...,x T t , respectively and λ is a regularization parameter.
Defining covariance matrix V t as follows:
[13] shows that with probability at least (1−δ ), where 0 < δ < 1, the true parameters of system Θ * belong to the confidence set defined by:
By the controllability and observability assumptions on (A,B) (assumption 1) there exists a unique positive definite solution P(Θ) to the algebraic Riccati equation (ARE):
for all (A,B) ∈ S. Under this assumption the linear optimal control law u(t) = K(P(Θ))x(t) where
is stabilizing, i.e. (A + BK(Θ)) < 1 and the average cost of control law with Θ = Θ * is the optimal average cost J(Θ * ) = trace(P(Θ * )).
In addition, boundedness of S results in boundedness of P(Θ) and K(Θ) with constants D and C respectively:
After finding high-probability confidence sets for the unknown parameter, the core step of the algorithm proposed in [13] is implementing the Optimism in the Face of Uncertainty (OFU) principle. At any time t, we choose a parameter Θ t ∈ S ∩C t (δ ) such that:
Then, by using the chosen parameters as if they were the true parameters, a stabilizing controller is designed by solving the Riccati equation. As can be seen in the regret bound analysis of [13] , recurrent switches in policy may worsen the performance, so a criterion is needed to prevent frequent policy switches. As such, at each time step t the algorithm checks the condition det(V t ) > 2det(V t−1 ) to determine whether updates to the control policy are needed. Algorithm 1, adopted from [13] , provides the detail procedure. The policy explicited in Algorithm 1 keeps the states of the underlying system bounded with high probability 1 − δ which is defined as the "good event" F t :
A second "good event" is associated with the confidence set defined as:
Algorithm 1 Adaptive Algorithm for LQ control problem
CalculateΘ t by (7) and set τ = t 7:
For the parameterΘ t solve ARE and calculate u t = K(Θ t )x t
12:
Apply the control and observe new state x t+1 . 13: Save (z t ,x t+1 ) into dataset 14 :
where both good events are defined in probability space Ω and α t has been explicited in [13] .
Finally, if we let E = E T and F = F T , then it is proven in [13] that intersection of E and F holds with high probability i.e. P(E ∩ F) ≥ 1 − δ 2.
By an appropriate decomposition of regret on the event E ∩ F, it is also shown that:
where
and
By bounding the above terms separately, for any T it is shown that with probability at least 1 − δ , the imposed regret is:
where max 1≤s≤T x s ≤ X T , W = Ln 2nlog(8n δ ) (from sub-Gaussianity assumption) and definition of B ′ δ is provided in [13] . As can be seen, the regret is O(
III. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND FORMULATION We are interested in the situation depicted in Figure 1 , where a controller designed based on Algorithm 1 operates in an adversarial environment.
As can be seen in Figure 1 , at each time instant t, the plant's state x a t is sent both to the controller block (to compute and implement control input u a t = K(Θ t )x t ), and to a database, where it is used to generate the covariance matrices Z s ,s ≥ t which are involved in the estimation of Θ from then on. Note the "a" superscript will be used from now on to denote the fact that we are considering state and control input of a system under attack (as opposed to the discussion of Section II). A similar notation will be used for extended state z a t as well, which contains both state and control input of the attacked system at t.
In the most general scenario, an attacker would likely disrupt all elements of the feedback loop, from poisoning the data stored in the database to blocking the transmission of the control input to modifying the estimation algorithm, and it would be necessary for the control schemes to be robust, in some sense, to all these manipulations. However, since the role played by stored data is unique to the control scheme presented in Section II, we focus solely on data poisoning attacks on the database in this work. We will henceforth refer to this attack model as a "database attack".
Accordingly, we assume that, at time t, (1) the controller receives the correct value x a t and, (2) this value is also correctly stored in the database at time t. However, (3) the attacker poisons the values of the state x a 1 ,...,x a t−1 stored in the database and replaces them bȳ
where η s is an a priori bounded signal unknown to the controller. Item (2) above is meant to capture the fact that data is checked as it is deposited in the database but not later (in such a way that a modification of x a t at time t could simply be noticed by comparing the stored value with that received by the controller, thus rendering such an attack useless). Other similar restrictions on the values that the attacker is permitted to modify in the database at time t (e.g., x a i for i ≤ t − k) could also be considered without affecting much of our analysis, as a way to account for longer memory at the controller.
We would argue, however, that once an implementation that separates "controller"-block and "database" has been chosen, it is natural to expect that this memory is finite and short (since, presumably, the reason why a database is used is that the controller has reduced storage space), thus making it possible for the attacker to modify at least some stored past values of the state at each time t without being noticed. Under this attack model, the dynamics of the stored poisoned data is given bȳ
whereX t and Z a t are matrices whose rows arex T 1 ,...,x T t and z aT 0 ,...,z aT t−1 respectively. Also, H t is a matrix constructed by rows η T 1 ,...,η T t−1 ,0 T and W t is a matrix with rows,ω T 1 ,...,ω T t . Then,for history of dataZ t given by dataset we have:
where Y t is a matrix constructed by rows ζ T 1 ,...,ζ T t defined as follows:
HavingZ t as the matrices whose rows arez T 1 ,...,z T t−1 , similar to (6,7), the normalized least square error can be written as:
As a result of matrix Z a t being replaced byZ t in (21b), the system's parameters are misestimated, which in turn may result in poor performance of the controller or even destabilization of the closed loop if Algorithm 1 is just implemented as-is.
An example of this behavior is provided in Figure 2 which displays the estimate (top) and regret (bottom) of a 'naive' controller designed using Algorithm 1 as-is in the face of data attacks of the kind described above. We consider a simple control system:
where we set a = 0.001, b = 0.001, R = 1 10, Q = 1 and assume that Assumption 1 holds. The inputs to the OFU algorithm are T = 8000, δ = 1 T , λ = 1, L = 0.1, s = 1 and we repeat simulation 50 times. The detail of solving constrained optimization problem of the algorithm is discussed in Section IV.
As can be seen in Figure 2 , the regret of the naive algorithm appears to become linear under attack, even though, as shown in (17), it is provably sub-linear O( √ T ) in the non-attacked case.
Our goal, in the remainder of this paper, is to modify the basic algorithm described in Section II to be able to weather database attacks (in the sense of preserving sub-linear regret and guaranteeing a bounded state with high probability). We show that this can be achieved by retaining the general structure outlined in Algorithm 1 while modifying the confidence bound β t (δ ) on the estimate Θ a t . We call the resulting controller "self-correcting" because it continuously modifies the value of β t (δ ) to account for the effects of database attacks.
Since this new bound is used to define the set C t (δ ) which explicitly appears in the algorithm, it must be computable without precise knowledge of the attack signal and only in terms of the a priori bounds on η. With this bound in hand, we can also prove a sub-linear bound on the regret of the self-correcting controller.
Before stating our main results, we give the following lemma, adapted from [12] which gives a self-normalized bound for vector-valued martingales. We will later use this result in our proofs.
Lemma 1: Let F k be a filtration,z k be a vector-valued stochastic process adapted to F k and ω k be real-valued martingale difference, again adapted to filtration F k which satisfies the conditionally sub-Gaussianity assumption (Assumption 2.4) with known constant L. Consider the martingale and co-variance matrices:
then with probability of at least 1 − δ , 0 < δ < 1 we have,
Proof: Proof has been provided in Theorem 3 and Corollary 1 in [13] . Also, the following lemma which provides an upper bound for det(V t ) is useful for the rest of analysis.
Lemma 2:
Proof: For a positive definite matrix M, we have det(M) ≤ det(M) whereM is a matrix with zero off-diagonal elements and diagonal elements equal to those of M. Hence, for det(V t ) we have:
In second inequality we applied AM-GM inequality and in the third inequality we apply the property (a+b) 2 ≤ 2a 2 +2b 2
A. Confidence Set in the Presence of Database Attack
As explained earlier, our first goal is to provide a new confidence bound on the error of parameter estimates in the presence of a database attack. This is the content of the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Let Assumption 1 hold (e.g. Θ * ≤ s) and assume the linear model represented in (5) satisfies Assumption 2 with a known L. LetΘ a t denote the least square estimate andV t = λ I + ∑ t−1 s=1zsz T s be co-variance matrix, then with probability at least 1 − δ we have:
if, in addition, max 1≤s≤t x a s ≤ X a,t , η t ≤ Λ, and ζ t ≤ Λ ∀t, the following statement holds with probability at least 1 − δ
in which p ∶= n + m. Proof: Substituting (19) into (21b) gives:
And then implementing (20) yields,
The last term in right hand side can be rewritten as follows:
For an arbitrary random covariate z we have,
taking norm on both sides and considering the fact that Θ * 2 V −1 t ≤ 1 λ Θ * 2 then we would have:
is bounded from above as:
As a result, with probability at least 1 − δ we will have,
In particular, choosing z =V t (Θ a t − Θ * ) and plugging it into (35) yields:
, the statement (26-27) holds. By applying Lemma 2, using the upper bounds for the norms Θ * , Z T Y , Z T H and elementary calculations the second part of theorem (28) can be shown.
B. Regret Bound Analysis of Attacked System
In this part, we analyze the regret bound of the selfcorrecting controller under database attack. The general form of regret bound analysis for an unattacked system presented in (13) (14) (15) (16) is directly applicable to this case as well except for the fact that the attack signal η is unknown a priori. This requires us to establish new upper bounds on terms R 1 , R 2 , and R 3 under attack. However, before proceeding to this, we are required to define the associated "good events" for the attacked system setting. Similar to (11) and (12) we define:
where C a t is defined as follows:
and where β a t is defined by Theorem 1 and α a t will be introduced later. The following lemma bounds 1 (F a ∩E a ) R 1 where 1 A is the indicator function of event A.
Lemma 3: Let R 1 be defined by (14), then with probability at least 1 − δ 2 we have:
where W = Ln 2nlog(8nT δ ) and
Proof: Proof follows from lemmas 6 and 7 in [13] . Consider (15) and Algorithm 1, it is clear that most of the terms of R 2 take zero value except those times that algorithm has switch in policy. The following lemma provides an upper bound for R 2 conditioned to the satisfaction of both good events F a ∩ E a .
Lemma 4: Consider R 2 depicted in (15), we have:
where max 1≤s≤t η t ≤ Λ t and max 1≤s≤T x a t ≤ X a,T . Proof: Proof follows the same steps as lemma 1 in [13] . Let us assume at time steps t n 1 ,...,t n N the algorithm 1 changes the policy. Therefore, we have det(V t n 1 ) ≥ 2λ n+m and det(V t n N ) ≥ 2 N−1 det(V t n 1 ). On the other hand we have:
and also we have det(V T )≤λ max (V T ) n+d that together with inequality (42) provides an upper bound for the number of policy switches N:
Then given (15) , the maximum number of switches in policy (43) and upper bound for P completes the proof. To bound the term R 3 we follow same steps as in [13] . However, we are required to express this bound in terms of states and extended states of the attacked system, x a t and z a t respectively. We borrow Lemma 3 from [12] .
Lemma 5: The following holds for t ≥ 1:
where (a ∧ b) denotes the minimum of a and b.
The proof is in [12] . To bound the term R 3 , it is required to find an upper bound for the summation ∑ The following lemma provides this upper bound. Lemma 6: The following holds for t ≥ 1:
From Lemma 12 of [13] we have the first inequality which is bounded above as follows:
Substituting the first term of the last expression by the result of Lemma 3, completes the proof.
The following Lemma provides the upper bound for R 3 . Lemma 7: Given R 3 defined by (16), then we have:
√ T (46) Proof: Proof directly follows the proof of Lemma 13 in [13] , however, for the sake of completeness we provide it here. 
applying the result of Lemma 4 and boundedness assumption of P andΘ t completes the proof. Notice that the term det(V T ) appearing in the regret bound analysis needs to be expressed as an explicit function of z a and the attack signal ζ . Lemma 2 deals with this concern. By taking the above bounds together the regret bound R a for the attacked system can be written as:
In this section, we investigate the performance of algorithm 1 for three settings of non-attacked system, selfcorrective (aware) and naive (unaware) attacked systems. This self-corrective algorithm, whose properties have been established above is equipped with an adaptive confidence set adjustment that takes into account the possible attack. This feature distinguishes the so-called self-corrective algorithm from the naive one whose performance has already been depicted and discussed in section III and Figure 2 . We consider the control system (22) to examine self-corrective algorithm and unattacked setting in order to carry out a comparison between the three settings. We apply the incremental gradient descent method, given in [17] to approximately solve the optimization problem (10) . The projected Newton method, Θ t ← PROJ C t (δ ) Θ t − αH Θ (Tr(P(Θ))) −1 ∇ Θ (Tr(P(Θ)))
is applied to solve the constrained optimization problem represented in (10) . ∇ Θ f and and H Θ f are the gradient and Hessian of f with respect to Θ. C t (Θ) is the confidence set, PROJ g is Euclidean projection on g and finally α is the step size. The computation of Hessian and ∇ Θ as well as formulation of projection has been explicited in [17] . It has graphically been shown in [17] that the objective function J(Θ) = Tr(P(Θ)) is generally non convex and when it comes to one dimensional system (n, m = 1) it is only convex in drift matrix, A.
The gradient sub-routine takes 200 steps to solve each OFU optimization problem where projection algorithm is applied until the projected point lies inside the confidence ellipsoid. Figure 3 shows the performance of corrective algorithm which has the privilege of adjusting its confidence set according to (27) . As can be seen in the figure, in the presence of attack, the corrective algorithm is able to keep its estimates close to the unknown parameters of the system. On the other hand, as demonstrated in Figure 2 the naive algorithm which sticks to the confidence set (8) , gradually fails to keep its estimates within a reasonable neighborhood of the true parameters' value. Figure 4 carries out a comparison between the imposed regret of the discussed algorithms. As it is expected, the regret is O( √ T ) in the absence of attack and the corrective algorithm outperforms the naive one (Figure 2(bottom) ) in dealing with attack which is due to the poor estimation of naive algorithm.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied an attacked-in-the-loop learning-based LQ adaptive control system where the system parameters are not known. We constructed a highly reliable confidence set around unknown parameters that enables the algorithm to keep its estimates close to true parameters in the presence of poisonous data injection into database. Furthermore, a regret bound analysis for the attacked setting is provided to give a measure for attack regret. Simulation results demonstrate the performance of the algorithm equipped with the new confidence set. Designing defense mechanism against simultaneous sensor and actuator attacks is the subject of a future research.
